

SECRET

Security Information

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Washington

2 February 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

Subject: Exchange of Classified Military Information with the United Kingdom and Disclosure to Certain Other Nations

The attached document establishes the policies which henceforth will govern the exchange of classified military information with the United Kingdom and disclosure to certain other nations. It represents the understanding reached, with my approval, in the recent meetings between a British delegation headed by Lieutenant General Sir Gerald Templer and an American group composed of representatives of the Departments of State and Defense and chairmanned by General Burns of my office, to the effect that the US and UK should adopt substantially identical policies in this field.

In my judgment these agreements are a great step forward in rationalizing the disclosure policies of the two governments, and by permitting the United Kingdom greater discretion in this matter, especially in their relations with the Commonwealth nations, we should notably contribute to the common defense of all the Western nations, particularly the signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty. Moreover, I look to the new arrangements to facilitate military cooperation of this country with these nations whose security generally lies in common with ours.

I therefore desire that in the implementation of these agreed policies every effort be made by the responsible divisions of the military Departments to translate into practice the spirit as well as the strict letter of the recommendations made by the British and American representatives, namely, that disclosure shall be the rule and withholding of information the exception.

You will observe that the policy statement contained in Document A records the policy that "The United States and the United Kingdom are agreed that it is in the interests of both countries that there should be a full and frank interchange to the greatest practicable degree of all classified military information and intelligence, except in a limited number of already declared fields. . . ." It is my understanding that these declared fields excluded from this policy are: information concerning atomic energy, cryptanalysis, communications intelligence, secret intelligence and Western Hemisphere matters in general. Any modification concerning these declared fields of

OSD REVIEW COMPLETED

**OSD REVIEW COMPLETED- NO OSD OBJECTION
TO DECLASSIFICATION**

SECRET

Security Information

SECRET

Security Information

exclusion will be made only after I have received the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and coordinated appropriately with other U. S. governmental departments and agencies and, if appropriate, with other governments concerned.

/s/ Louis Johnson

cc Chairman, Research and Development Board
Chairman, Munitions Board
Chairman, Military Liaison Committee
Mr. John C. Elliott
General Irwin

EXPLANATORY NOTE (By Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2)

1. The "declared fields" as referred to in the foregoing memorandum are again listed and further defined as follows:

- a. Atomic Energy Information--RESTRICTED DATA only.
- b. Cryptoanalysis
- c. Communications Intelligence
- d. Secret Intelligence (Evaluated Intelligence on the UK and the Commonwealth Nations).
- e. Western Hemisphere defense matters in general.
- f. Information falling within the provisions of paragraph 7a (6), (7), (8) and (11) DA-DCMI.

SECRET

Security Information

SECRET

Security Information

DOCUMENT "A"

**POLICY STATEMENT REGARDING U. S.-U. K.
EXCHANGE OF CLASSIFIED MILITARY INFORMATION**

(Approved 17 February 1950)

The United States and the United Kingdom are agreed that it is in the interests of both countries that there should be a full and frank interchange to the greatest practicable degree of all classified military information and intelligence, except in a limited number of already declared fields, it being understood that either Government may subsequently declare any newly-developed fields or projects as excepted upon due notification to the other Government.

In this connection it is agreed that the flow of information over the whole field of guided missiles shall be resumed at once.

NOTE

Conclusions reached in October 1950 by the U. K. and U. S. on the interpretation of Document A are as follows:

1. The United States and United Kingdom representatives are satisfied that there exists a full and frank interchange within the letter and spirit of Document A of classified military information between the two Governments.
2. The United States and United Kingdom representatives agree, however, that each Government should continue its efforts to increase the volume of information made available on an automatic or voluntary basis, as well as studying ways and means of improving present exchange procedures.
3. Recognizing that both Governments are subject to certain legal limitations in respect to proposed releases involving proprietary rights, the United States and United Kingdom representatives are agreed that both will make every effort to overcome the obstacles to release arising from such limitations.

SECRET

Security Information

SECRET

Security Information

DOCUMENT "B"

SECURITY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM CHIEFS OF STAFF

(Approved August 1948)

1. The United States Chiefs of Staff will make every effort to insure that the United States will maintain the military security classifications established by United Kingdom authorities with respect to military information of U.K. origin, and the military security classifications established by U.K. - U.S. agreement with respect to military information of joint U.K. - U.S. origin or development; will safeguard accordingly such military information; will not exploit such information for production for other than military purposes; and, will not disclose such military information to a third nation without U.K. consent. The British Chiefs of Staff will make every effort to insure that the United Kingdom will maintain the military security classifications established by the U.S. authorities with respect to military information of U.S. origin, and the military security classifications established by U.K. - U.S. agreement with respect to military information of joint U.K. - U.S. origin or development; will safeguard accordingly such military information; will not exploit such information for production for other than military purposes; and will not disclose such military information to a third nation without U.S. consent. This agreement applies to military information disclosed by the United States to the United Kingdom or by the United Kingdom to the United States or exchanged between the United States and the United Kingdom on and after the date of acceptance of this agreement by the United Kingdom. The provisions contained in C.C.S. 953/1 and 953/2 will apply to information disclosed by either country to the other or exchanged between the United States and the United Kingdom between 1 Sep 39 and the date of acceptance of this agreement by the United Kingdom.

2. The United States Chiefs of Staff and the British Chiefs of Staff agree that, insofar as the U.S. and the U.K. are concerned, the safeguards indicated above also apply to information developed by the U.S. and U.K. jointly in collaboration with a third nation.

3. It is agreed that the provisions of C.C.S. 210/4 shall remain in full force and effect until cancelled or superseded by another agreement which shall then be controlling in this respect.

4. It is agreed in respect of classified information communicated by one country to the other, that the recipient country shall use its best endeavors within the framework of its laws and rules to prevent any loss of patent rights in the information. Specifically it is declared and agreed that:

SECRET

Security Information

SECRET

Security Information

a. Any rights of the originator to obtain patent protection in the recipient country in respect of the information communicated are not and will not be prejudiced by virtue of the introduction of the information into such country.

b. The information, so long as it remains classified, will not be used or disclosed by the recipient country in any manner likely to prejudice the rights of the originator to obtain patent protection in respect thereof, but if the recipient country desires to use or to disclose the information in any manner likely so to prejudice the rights of the originator, then the recipient country will immediately notify the country of origin of the full circumstances of such intended use or disclosure, and such use or disclosure shall not be effected until approval is given by the country of origin.

c. Each country when so requested by the other and to the extent consistent with its laws and rules will use its best endeavors

(1) to have maintained in secrecy any patent application filed in the recipient country in respect of the information for so long as may be desired by the country of origin, and

(2) to supply reports of the manner in which the information embodied in a patent application has been used or disclosed.

5. For the purpose of this agreement the United Kingdom, the British Dominions, and India are considered to be separate nations.*

*See Document C.

SECRET

Security Information

SECRET

Security Information

DOCUMENT "C"

POLICY WITH RESPECT TO COMMONWEALTH NATIONS

(Approved 17 February 1950)

1. The general principle of the security agreement will be maintained: that the Government of the United Kingdom seek the consent of the U. S. prior to the release to third nations of information of U. S. or U. S. - U. K. origin; and that the United States Government seek the consent of the U. K. prior to the release to third nations of information of U. K. or of U. K. - U. S. origin.

2. a. The U. S. reserves its right to disclose information of sole U. S. origin directly to any foreign nation.

b. The U. K. reserves its right to disclose information of sole U. K. origin directly to any foreign nation.

3. However, to meet the special needs of the U. K. with respect to the other nations comprising the British Commonwealth, and to enable these nations to obtain as much information as possible in the interests of common defense, the general principle set forth in Paragraph 1 above is hereby modified in the following respects:

A. In order to facilitate the exchange of classified military information as between the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada, the following arrangements will maintain: (Approved by US/UK/Canada Military Information Board on 15 November 1950).

(1) The United Kingdom and Canada may exchange freely without prior United States consent classified military information of United States origin, of combined United States - Canadian origin, or of combined United States - United Kingdom origin, except for information relating to Western Hemisphere defense provided that:

(a) Only in exceptional circumstances will the United Kingdom and Canada exchange documents originating wholly in the United States.

(2) The United States and Canada may exchange freely without prior United Kingdom consent classified military information of United Kingdom origin, of combined United Kingdom - Canadian origin, or of combined United States - United Kingdom origin provided that:

(a) Only in exceptional circumstances will the United States and Canada exchange documents originating wholly in the United Kingdom.

SECRET

Security Information

SECRET

Security Information

(3) The United States and the United Kingdom may exchange freely without prior Canadian consent classified military information of Canadian origin, of combined United Kingdom - Canadian origin or of combined United States - Canadian origin except for information relating to Western Hemisphere defence provided that:

(a) Only in exceptional circumstances will the United States and United Kingdom exchange documents originating wholly in Canada.

B. (1) The U. K. may, at its discretion, exchange with Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India, Pakistan, or Ceylon, without prior U. S. consent classified military information of U. S. origin or of combined U. S. - U. K. origin, provided that:

(a) With respect to information in the fields of strategic planning and research and development:

Such information falls within the content and scope of specific projects agreed to by the U. K. and the U. S. as being releasable projects in respect of a specified Commonwealth nation or nations.

(b) With respect to information in the fields of intelligence, tactical and technical doctrine and training, and materiel (military equipment which has passed the research and development stage):

Such information falls within the content and scope of specific projects agreed by the U. K. and the U. S. as being projects which the U. K. may release to any Commonwealth nation which the U. K. deems to be a suitable recipient when evaluated in accordance with the criteria set forth in Paragraph 5, below.

(c) When U. S. or combined U. S. - U. K. information relating to an approved project is released to a Commonwealth nation or nations, the nation or nations will be informed by the U. K. that the U. S. has agreed to the disclosure.

(d) The U. K. furnish to the U. S. periodic reports identifying specific documentary materials released to any of the named Commonwealth nations when such documents are of U. S. or combined U. S. - U. K. origin.

(e) The U. K. and/or other Commonwealth nation or nations concerned furnish to the U. S., when requested by the U. S., reports on the progress and results of the specific projects approved in accordance with subparagraph B (1) (a) and (b) above.

(2) While the U. S. recognizes the special relationship between the U. K. and the other Commonwealth nations and the desirability in practice for the U. K. to initiate and effect the disclosures provided for in this agreement, it is agreed as a matter of principle that the U. S. may, at its discretion, exchange with Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India, Pakistan, or Ceylon, without prior U. K. consent classified military information of U. K. origin or of combined U. K. - U. S. origin, provided that:

SECRET

Security Information

SECRET

Security Information

(a) With respect to information in the fields of strategic planning and research and development:

Such information falls within the content and scope of specific projects agreed to by the U. S. and the U. K. as being releasable projects in respect of a specified Commonwealth nation or nations.

(b) With respect to information in the fields of intelligence, tactical and technical doctrine and training, and materiel (military equipment which has passed the research and development stage):

Such information falls within the content and scope of specific projects agreed by the U. S. and the U. K. as being projects which the U. S. may release to any Commonwealth nation which the U. S. deems to be a suitable recipient when evaluated in accordance with the criteria set forth in Paragraph 5, below.

(c) When U. K. or combined U. K. - U. S. information relating to an approved project is released to a Commonwealth nation or nations, the nation or nations will be informed by the U. S. that the U. K. has agreed to the disclosure.

(d) The U. S. furnish to the U. K. periodic reports identifying specific documentary materials released to any of the named Commonwealth nations when such documents are of U. K. or combined U. K. - U. S. origin.

(e) The U. S. and/or the Commonwealth nation or nations concerned furnish to the U. K., when requested by the U. K., reports on the progress and results of the specific projects approved in accordance with subparagraph B (1) (a) and (b) above.

4. At any time that a project is agreed as "releasable" or at any time thereafter, either the U. K. or the U. S. may specify that a certain item or items within that project are not to be released to one or more of the Commonwealth nations.

5. The criteria to be taken into consideration is the establishment of "releasable" projects under the terms of subparagraphs 3 B (1) (a) and (b) and 3 B (2) (a) and (b) above shall include:

A. The principle of "need to know" established for each Commonwealth nation in the light of its strategic role of its ability or potential ability to contribute to the common defense in the fields of manpower, production, or research and development.

B. Recognition of the importance of maintaining among the Commonwealth nations the will to resist aggression and to make the maximum contribution to the common defense.

C. The principle that the U. K. should be in a position to make available to the other Commonwealth nations the most up-to-date equipment issued to the armed forces of the U. K.

SECRET

Security Information

SECRET

Security Information

D. The standard of security in the Commonwealth nation or nations concerned.

6. Agreement has been reached in respect of a specific subject as set forth in Annex 2 to Document C.

7. It is recognized that a differentiation exists between Government- and privately -owned information of U. S. or U. K. origin. Information already released by either the U. S. or the U. K. will be cleared between the two Governments on an individual item basis before release to third nations. In the future, the nation of origin will determine whether the information is privately- or Government-owned and will state whether the Commonwealth nation concerned may receive such privately-owned information.

NOTE

Conclusions reached in October 1950 by the U. K. and the U. S. on the interpretation of Document C are as follows:

1. With respect to proposals for the establishment of Commonwealth projects as provided for in paragraph 3 B of Document C, the U. K. and U. S. representatives agreed as follows:

(a) The United Kingdom should make full substantiation of its project proposals in terms of the criteria set forth in paragraph 5 of Document C.

(b) Whenever the United States considers the United Kingdom substantiation to be incomplete they should seek further information from the United Kingdom authorities:

(c) The criteria set forth in paragraph 5 of Document C are applicable both (i) to the establishment of releasable projects and (ii) to the subsequent exercise of discretion on specific releases. In determining its attitude towards a proposal to establish a releasable project the United States should apply these criteria liberally bearing in mind the United Kingdom's further responsibility under (ii).

(d) Recognizing the right of the United States to limit the content of a Commonwealth project, either before or after establishment, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 4 of Document C, the United States will normally not permit the origin of the information to be a relevant factor in its action concerning the content of a project.

SECRET

Security Information

SECRET
Security Information

ANNEX 1

INTERPRETATION OF CERTAIN TERMS USED IN THIS DOCUMENT

1. The definition of "combined military information" and the procedures for the resolution of differences concerning releases of combined military information to third nations are set forth in the Agreed Charter establishing the U. S. - U. K. - Canada Military Information Board.

2. a. "United States Information" does not become combined U. S. - U. K. information merely by virtue of its release by the U. S. to the U. K.

b. "United Kingdom Information" does not become combined U. S. - U. K. information merely by virtue of its release by the U. K. to the U. S.

3. In order that the establishment of projects will not be hampered by the rigid adherence to a strictly defined term, the word "project" is not defined herein but shall, in general, include an agreed upon area of effort, such as an undertaking to develop an item (a tank, an airplane, a weapons system, a radar system, or a principal component thereof), a tactical or doctrinal procedure, a training program, or an intelligence study.

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET

Security Information

ANNEX 2

TRAINING PUBLICATIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS

Agreement has been reached in respect of the following specific subject within the framework of the above policy:

United States military information, classified no higher than SECRET, and exclusive of Intelligence and Research and Development information may, at the discretion of the U.K., be included in the U. K. training publications and instructions for issue to the other Commonwealth nations. This should not be construed as implying that publications and instructions of U. S. origin of the classification of "SECRET," "CONFIDENTIAL," and "RESTRICTED" or other information so classified, may be sent by the U. K. to the other Commonwealth nations, in their original form, without prior U. S. approval.

SECRET

Security Information

SECRET

Security Information

DOCUMENT "D"

CHARTER OF THE U. S.-U. K.-CANADA

MILITARY INFORMATION BOARD

(Revised and Approved by MIB on 3 August 1950)

It has been agreed by the appropriate United States, United Kingdom and Canadian authorities to establish the U. S. - U. K. - Canada Military Information Board, (M. I. B.) hereinafter referred to as the "Board."

PURPOSE

1. The Board is established for the purpose of providing a combined body wherein problems arising out of proposed disclosures to fourth nations by any of the appropriate United States, United Kingdom or Canadian authorities of "combined Military information," defined in Paragraph 2 below may be resolved.

FUNCTIONS AND POWERS

2. The Board shall decide whether disclosures to fourth nations of combined military information proposed by the United States, the United Kingdom or Canada shall be permitted. Combined military information is defined as follows:

(a) Classified military information resulting or originating from projects developed on a combined basis either between U. S. and U. K.; or U. S. and Canada; or U. K. and Canada; or U. S., U. K. and Canada.

(b) Other classified military information determined by the Board from time to time to be combined military information.

The criteria upon which the Board will base its determination under paragraph 2(b) are:

(1) The appropriate U. S. - U. K. - Canadian authorities or any two thereof have agreed to undertake separately, different phases of a specific project; or

(2) The appropriate U. S. - U. K. - Canadian authorities or any two thereof have agreed that one or two of the countries will assume sole project responsibility on behalf of all; or

(3) The appropriate U. S. - U. K. - Canadian authorities or any two thereof have agreed at the outset of the project to adopt the best results of independent endeavors.

SECRET

Security Information

SECRET
Security Information

MEMBERSHIP

3. The Board shall consist of (a) an official of the U. S. Department of State, (b) an official of the British Embassy in Washington, (c) an official of the Canadian Embassy in Washington, (d) an officer or official from each of the U. S. military departments (Army, Navy, Air Force), (e) an official of the U. S. Research and Development Board, (f) an officer or official from each of the offices of the British Joint Services Mission, Washington, (Navy Staff, Army Staff, Air Force Staff, and Technical Services), and (g) an officer or official from each of the offices of the Canadian Joint Staff, Washington (Navy Staff, Army Staff, Air Force Staff and Defence Research Board Staff).

There may be present at meetings of the Board such U. S. , U. K. or Canadian consultants or observers as desired.

CHAIRMANSHIP

4. The Chairmanship of the Board shall be held on a monthly basis in alphabetical succession by the representatives of the three countries.

PLACE OF MEETINGS

5. Unless otherwise provided for, meetings of the Board shall be held in Washington.

6. A combined secretariat shall be established by the Board.

DECISIONS OF BOARD

7. All decisions of the Board shall be taken by unanimous agreement of the interested parties as determined by the application of paragraph 2 above.

PROCEDURES

8. (a) Rules of Procedure

Except as provided in paragraph 7, the Board shall adopt its own rules of procedure for conduct of its business, including the establishment of committees.

(b) Processing of Requests

(1) Requests normally will be processed through direct presentation to the Board by members, except that:

(2) In the processing of requests applicable to groups or combinations of nations, or states members thereof, the Board will prescribe such special procedures as it considers desirable.

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET

Security Information

ANNEX 1

PROCEDURE FOR HANDLING PROPOSALS
FOR THE RELEASE OF COMBINED U. S.-U. K.-CANADIAN
CLASSIFIED MILITARY INFORMATION TO NATO COUNTRIES

(Approved by MIB on 15 May 1951)

- I. Proposals for the release of Combined Classified Military Information arising in the Military Standardization Agency FOR STANDARDIZATION (MAS)
 1. Any standardization project put forward in the M. S. A. could require the release of classified military information of U. S. , U. K. , Canadian and/or of combined origin.
 2. Where information of combined origin is involved, the following procedure is prescribed: The delegate of each Government concerned will, when necessary, refer to his Service authorities for consideration the proposal and extent of the information desired to be released and the justification therefore. These Service authorities will forward to their MAS delegated for communication to the other owner countries, with a request for approval, a statement which includes:
 - (a) Confirmation that the information is combined or details as to ownership,
 - (b) An indication of whether the Government is prepared to authorize or acquiesce in release.
 3. If, after the respective Governments have been consulted, the MAS delegate of one owner country is unable to accept the statement produced by another owner country required by paragraph 2 above, the MAS delegates concerned will come together in an attempt to resolve the problem. If the problem cannot be resolved, it will be open to the MAS delegate of the US, and UK or Canada to give notice that he proposes to ask his Government to refer the problem to the Military Information Board.
- II. Proposals for the release of Combined Classified Military Information not relating to NATO Standardization (i. e., Through channels other than M. S. A.)
 4. Proposals to release to NATO countries combined classified military information not relating to NATO standardization will be handled as follows:
 - (a) When the UK receives or initiates the request, the UK authorities will submit a case for the release of the information to the U. S. and/or Canadian authorities, through BJSM, Washington to the appropriate U. S. military department and/or through the CJS (London), who will obtain their Governments' views and reply through the same channel.

SECRET

Security Information

SECRET

Security Information

(b) When U.S. receives or initiates the request, the U.S. authorities will submit a case for the release of information to the U.K. and/or Canadian representatives in the U.S. (BJSM and the CJS (Washington)) who will obtain their Governments' views and reply through the same channel.

(c) When Canada receives or initiates a request, the Canadian authorities will submit a case for the release of information to the U.K. and/or U.S. through CJS, London and Washington respectively to obtain the views of the UK and US Governments who should reply through the same channel.

5. If agreement cannot be reached it will be open to any of the three Governments to refer the matter to the Military Information Board.

III. Classified Military Information owned wholly by a Government other than that receiving the request.

6. If a Government receiving a request determines that the information is owned wholly by another Government, the recipient Government will so inform the applicant.

SECRET

Security Information

SECRET

Security Information

ANNEX 2

AGREED CATEGORIES OF COMBINED MILITARY INFORMATION

Statement to be incorporated in first procedural paper to be prepared by the U. S. - U. K. Military Information Board.

A. Only one highly secret subject, which is already covered by special U. S. - U. K. arrangements, release of which to a third nation would be subject at the time of the request to the specific authority of the U. S. and the U. K. in each case.

B. Combined U. S. - U. K. information classified RESTRICTED through TOP SECRET, the release of which to a third nation would be subject, at the time of the request, to the specific authority of both the U. S. and the U. K. in each case.

C. Combined U. S. - U. K. information relating to a specific project classified CONFIDENTIAL or RESTRICTED, the release of which to a third nation may be accomplished unilaterally either by the U. K. or the U. S. subject to the following procedures:

a. At the initiation of the Project or at any time thereafter the U. S. and U. K. agreed to assign this project to Category C.

b. The U. S. and U. K. mutually agree on that group of nations to which the release of the information on the particular project would be permissible.

SECRET

Security Information

SECRET

Security Information

ANNEX 3

EFFECT ON COMBINED COMMUNICATIONS BOARD

The United States and British Teams agreed:

To incorporate in the first procedural paper to be prepared by the U. S. - U. K. Military Information Board a statement of understanding to the effect that the functions of the Combined Communications Board or its successor agency will be unaffected by the establishment of the U. S. - U. K. Military Information Board.

SECRET

Security Information

SECRET

Security Information

ANNEX 4

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE

In the course of discussions between representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom on the subject of the exchange and/or disclosure of classified military information on January 23, 1950, the representatives of the United Kingdom requested that the following statement be placed in the record:

The representatives of the Government of the United Kingdom wish to place on record that they consider it most essential that the C. M. I. B. procedure should be expeditious in operation and should take account of factors wider than security alone. This should be made clear in the directives addressed by each Government to their representatives on the Board.

SECRET

Security Information

SECRET

Security Information

DOCUMENT "E"

STATEMENT REGARDING EMPLOYMENT OF FOREIGN NATIONALS

(Approved 17 February 1950)

It is recognized that the employment by either the United States or the United Kingdom on work involving access to classified military information of individual nationals of third countries is a matter entirely within the discretion of the employing nation, which will be responsible for applying adequate security safeguards.

SECRET

Security Information

DOCUMENT "F"

**POLICY REGARDING THE DISCLOSURE OF CERTAIN
CLASSIFIED MILITARY INFORMATION
TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY NATIONS**

(Approved 17 February 1950)

It is agreed that both the United States and the United Kingdom have the discretion to release classified U.S. - U.K. combined military information in the fields of established and published technical and tactical training and doctrine and materiel to the nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to permit adequate use of equipment and materiel furnished them by either the U.S. or the U. K.

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET

Security Information

DOCUMENT "G"

**POLICY RESPECTING THE DISCLOSURE OF
GUIDED MISSILES INFORMATION TO AUSTRALIA**

(Approved 17 February 1950)

Within the framework of the "Policy with Respect to Commonwealth Nations," the following principle has been agreed to:

The United Kingdom Government may exchange with the appropriate authorities of the Australian Government without prior U. S. consent, information of U. S. origin or of combined U. S. - U. K. origin on installation, instrumentation and operating techniques of long range proving grounds, and such classified research and development information regarding the guided missiles themselves as is necessary for the development of the general U. K. - Australian guided missiles program, subject to the conclusion of satisfactory arrangements between the U. S. and Australian Governments with respect to the safeguarding of such information. Procedures for effecting the release of such information by the U. K. authorities to the Australian authorities concerned will be reviewed in detail by the representatives of the U. K. and U. S. Governments.

NOTE

Conclusions reached in October 1950 by the U. K. and U. S. on the interpretation of Document G. are as follows:

The United Kingdom will furnish in detail the United Kingdom-Australian guided missile program on a yearly basis at which time the United States will review the program with a view toward authorizing the United Kingdom to release to Australia that United States or combined U. S. - U. K. information considered necessary for the accomplishment of the United Kingdom-Australian guided missile program.

SECRET

Security Information

2003/06/05
Approved For Release 2003/06/05 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003400170002-9

SECRET

Security Information

2003/06/05 - For. Sec. Div.

TEMPLER-BURNS AGREEMENT

SECRET

Security Information

Approved For Release 2003/06/05 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003400170002-9